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Considerable public resources in both high and low-income countries
are devoted to the subsidization of fertility control and health investments.
The effects of these programs are thus of some concern, and social scien
tists have devoted attention to the evaluation of these programs.

Most

evaluation studies (e.g., Hermalin (1972), Khan and Sirageldin (1979),
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1981), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982)) have
essentially compared the variation in measures of the intensity of pro
ram-effort across localities with the corresponding inter-area variation
in fertility and health.

Little or no attention has been paid to the

causes of the cross-area variability in the levels of such programs.
Yet, if the allocation of public health and family planning services or
subv_en_tions across localities is systematically related to factors
determining fertility and health outcomes that are known to subsidy pro
viders but unobserved by researchers, such cross-sectional estimates
will produce misleading conclusions

about program effectiveness.

Interest has grown recently in incorporating endogenous public resource
allocations within models concerned with private agent behavior.

Empirical

applications or tests of such models, however, have been scarce and have
been principally concentrated in the area of agricultural policy (Guttman
(1978), Huffman and Miranowski (1981), Huffman and McNulty (forthcoming)).
Moreover, existing general economic theories of public allocations do not
provide much guidance for predicting how publicly-financed human capital
subsidies and, in particular, "family planning" subsidies are distributed
among heterogenous recipie~ts. ·Altruism theories of public transfers
(Hochman and Rodgers (1969), Roberts (1984)) would appear to suggest
that the least-endowed receive the highest transfers, but such models
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provide no rationale for the use of subsidies to particular goods such
as contraceptives.

Pressure-group theory (Becker (1982)) suggests that

groups that are (i) relatively small in number, (ii) have and can cormnand
resources for lobbying and (iii) derive the greatest benefits from public
transfers or interventions will receive the highest transfers.

This model

would appear to imply that the rich--small in number and with greater·
resources--rather than the poor would receive the highent fertility control
subsidies, since, assuming that the poor have the largest.families

and face

the same prices~they avert less births than the rich and thus benefit least
from subsidies to fertility control.
While the existence of externalities from health (infection) might
provide

a Pigovian

(and pressure-group) rationale for the subvention of
i

health investments among the lpw-health poor, the empirical and theoretical
rationale for fertility control subsidization based on the existence of
direct

population externalities is less clear (Eckstein and Wolpin (1984)).

Moreover, since a birth from any source contributes equally to population
growth, the existence of population externalities (e.g., congestion) does
not obviously provide a basis for selective subsidization of households
1
by income or human capital endowments • A model of health and family
planning subsidies is needed.
In this paper we formulate and test an optimizing model deter
mining the distribution of family planning and health subsidies across
heterogenous households and assess the biases in cross-area estimates of
the health effects of such subsidies due to public resource optimization.
The model incorporates different features of the general theories of
public allocations:

the welfare of ."donor" households is

directly

I.·
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but

asymmetrica lly affected by the behavior of

in altruism models;

recipient households, as

thus, recipients of subventions have an intrinsic

advantage in obtaining resource transfers, as implied by competitive
interest group models, but the distributio n of subsidies is a function
of price effects as well as recipient characteris tics, as in optimal
taxation models.

The model is used to derive rules for the distributio n

of both health and fertility control subsidies and to discern the con
ditions under which subsidies to fertility control alone or in combination
with health subsidies are optimal (Pareto-imp roving), without resort to
arbitrary specificatio ns of population externalitie s or altruistic concern
for family size.
In section 1, the model is set out.

•

It is shown that when there is

a health externality , s.ubsidizati on of fertility control can substitute
pervasively for a health subsidy if and only if family size and health are
gross substitutes .

It is then shown that when only family planning subsidies

are provided, such subsidies are likely to be distributed disproporti onately
to low-health households, resulting in underestima tion of the health
effects of family planning programs from cross-sectio n data.

In the next

section, it is demonstrated that a combination of family planning and
health subsidies are Pareto-impr oving in the presence of the health ex
ternality even when cross-price effects and fertility externaliti es
are absent.

It is then shown that the distributio n of the two subsidies

will be positively correlated across areas (even in the absence of admini
strative scale economics), but it is impossible to establish whether such
subsidies, when jointly provided, will favor the least or most endowed
·of recipient households.

In section 2, longitudinal data describing child health and publicly
provided family planning and health programs in 20 barrios in Laguna
Province in the Philippines are used to estimate the effects of such pro
grams on child health and the relationships between the distribution of
the programs and pre-program health levels, i.e., the governmental
allocation rules.

The results are consistent with the model:

(i)

dates

of family planning and health program initiation across barrios are posi
tively correlated, (ii) family size and health are gross substitutes among
households and in some barrios family planning programs but not health
programs are present; (iii) both programs were ini.tiated earliest in the
low-health barrios and (iv)

as a consequence, the positive and significant

child health effects of both the family planning and health programs are
.
completely obsc'!red when no account is taken of the systematic associations
between program placement and areal health endowments.
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1.

Mode ling the Distr ibutio n of Healt h and Famil y Plann ing
Subsi dies
a.

Evalu ating Subsi dy Effec ts on Healt h Produ ction Among
Heter ogeneo us House holds

Consi der a set of T low-in come house holds each resid ing
in a dif
feren t healt h enviro nmen t.

Each house hold i choos es a level of healt h for
i
its child ren H,
its famil y size Ni and its consu mptio n Zi solvi ng the
follow ing proble m:

where healt h produ ction is descr ibed by the funct ion
Hi = h(Xi, Ni) +µ i

(2)

hi > 0, h i , h
X

,

xx

NN

< O,

subje ct to the full incom e const raint
(3)

F

i

= p~

i

(vi
+ (pc - si)
c

where Xi = per-c hild healt h inpu t,~ i
'

=

exoge nous, healt h param eter or

endowment, Fi= full incom e net of taxes , if any; vi=
poten tial ferti lity in
the absen ce of ferti lity contr ol; pK
p

c

= price

of good K,

K

= N, X, Z;

= cost of ferti lity contr ol or averte d birth s, and si
and si are perC
X

unit subsi dies to ferti lity contr ol and healt h input s,
respe ctive ly, pro2
vided in each healt h enviro nmen t by a centr al "gove rnmen
t" or donor .

The solut ion for each house hold's avera ge per-c hild healt
h net of the
.·envi ronme ntal effec t in terms of the exoge nous varia bles
uniqu e to it is

i

(4)

i

i

s C ' F ' 1-1 ) •
i

Estimation of (4) to obtain the average effect of the subsidy s. on child
J

health when µi is unobserved yields the estimate:
i

(5)

i
dsj _
dHi = hi dX~
+ hi dN + ( i) 1 '
i
X d 1
N d s.i
dµ
ds.
s.
J

J

j = x, c,

J

The true effect of a change in the subsidy s. on the health outcome is
J

given by the first two terms in (5): the subsidy (price) effects on the
health input provided to each child and on family size weighted by their respectiv,
marginal health effects,from (2).
arises when theµ
sidy rates.

.

i

The third term in (5) is the bias which

are unobserved by the researcher an~ vary with the sub-

Only if the subsidies are distributed independently of the

i

µ, or, more generally, of any of the parameters unique to each area which
influence health investments, will the association between the subsidies
and health net of observed variables provide unbiased estimates of subsidy
effects;
The sign of the bias in (5) will obviously depend on the allocation
rules·used by the agents who distribute the subsidies.

If such agents

fo_llow a compensatory rule, for example, providing higher subsidies to
less-endowed areas, then the subsidy effects obtained from (4) estimated,
say, by least squares will understate the true consequences of increasing
the subsidy for any randomly-chosen household; if such subsidies go to
the better-endowed, their effect will be overestimated.Consideration of
the possibly systematic association between subsidies provided to agents
and the environmental or other characteristics of the agents in the esti
mation of subsidy effects clearly yields better (policy-relevant) estimates
of those effects.

Moreover, such estimates also permit the testing of models_
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of governmental resource allocations, which should provide the rules by
which public resources are distributed among heterogenous agents or
localities, as well as a rationale for the particular set of instruments
used to effect resource transfers.
b.

The Optimality of Family Planning Subsidies and their Distribution

To discern the rules by which subsidies to fertility control might
be distributed among households behaving as described above in the
absence of any arbitrarily-assumed direct population externality,
consider a wealtlyhousehold having the same objective function as in (1)
but facing a health externality.

In particular, let the technology of

health production for the well-off household be

H = h(X, N, H*)

(6)

where H* is the mean health of the children in the T low-income
households, i.e.,
T

H* = L
i=l

(7)

where ai = Ni/(

i ~)

Thus, while the health of the
i=l
well-off children depends on the mean health of the children of the poor, there
is no direct fertility externality.

As in altruism models,

the externality is asymmetric--poor households do not consider or are
not affected by the consumption set of the "donor" household.
Assume that the wealthyhousehold can observe all the health endowments
but, initially, cannot subsidize health investments and cannot tax fertility
directly (s

C

i_

~

-

O).

If each household's fertility control is differentially

subsidized, the budget constraint for the wealt~household is:
(8)

G = PNN +Pc (V - N) + P XXN + P zz + L s! (1 + 0!) (}- Ni),
i

where G = full income of the high-income household and ei is the loss in subc

sidy transfers to the ith household associated with transaction costs
(waste, graft).

In this setup, the transfer scheme is politically

feasible, since the majority of households (the poor) and possibly all
households·are potentially better off.

The questions are:1) under what

conditions will the wealthy household subsidize fertility contro_l
and 2) how will the subsidy, if warranted,be distributed among the poor
households.
Maximization of the wealthy-household utility function subject to
(8), (9) and the price-taking behavior of the. poor households, as described
by model (1) through {3), yields the equilibrium conditions:
i
.s
(9)

C

-=-

i = 1 ••• T

s

i
C

or pc

=

0.
i

where ~*=(aH/aH*) (H*/H) and £RX= (aH/aX) (X/H), from (7); £HX =
i.

ii

i

ii

ii

i

(dH /ar} (X /H) and EHN= (aH /aN) (N /H) from (2); and then are
i

> 0.

the demand price elasticities characterizing the ith household.Note nNp
C

Condition (9)

has

two terms •. The first contains the health

gains to the rich household associated with increasing the fertility
control subsidy.

There are three sources of gains:

the first term in

brackets is the health return which occurs because of cross
price effects. Raising the fertility control subsidy increases health

i
if fertility and child health are gross substitutes, as nXp

< O.

The

C

second term is the return due to the direct or biological effect of family
size on child health,.through (2), in poor households.
positive gain if decreases in family size

This term corresponds to a

biologically augment child health.

The third bracketed term is the "eradication" effect of fertility control
subsidies--decr eases in the size of families with below-average child
health (Hi <H*) increase the mean health of the poor households; family
planning subsidies provided to the lowest-health households thus increase
the health of the wealthy households

via the health externality even if

fertility and child health are independent (in terms of price or biological
effects)

in poor households.

The second term in condition (9) is the marginal cost incurred by
the wealthy from increasing the fertility control subsidy to household i.
Such costs are higher the greater the number of averted births (the lower
is fertility), the smaller the own price elasticity of fertility, and the
higher are transaction costs.
Condition (9) indicates that fertility control subsidies can be used
as substitutes for health.subsidie s for all poor households when there is a health
but not a population externality and even when no biological relationship exists
between fertility and child health, as long as the fertility control crossprice elasticity for health is sufficiently strong and negative; i.e., fertility
3

and health are gross substitutes.

Condition (9) also suggests

. that, given the optimality of fertility control subsidization, the lowest
health (eradication effect) and the highest-fertili ty
(cost effect) households would receive

l.U

the largest family planning subsidies.

However,

this does not imply

that those households with the lowest health endowments receive the
highest subsidies.
effects.

Indeed, the distributional rules will depend on price

To see this, consider the effect on the subsidy rate to the

ith household when that household experiences an increase in its health
endowment µi and adjusts its behavior accordingly.

For simplicity,

assume that the ith household's health is (initially) at the mean of the
health distribution of poor households, i.e., Hi - H* = 0.
entiation

of the system of first-order conditions describing the wealthy-

household allocations,
dsi

· (10)

Total differ

C

treating price effects as parameters~ yields:

p N

·i =
dµ

[ (---2!._

h

X

i
.
hi (1 - a)
X
ENi

i

<:xpc )

. i
(dX ) - 1) (dN .)
dp
dµ1.
C

.p N .
a1~
h1
h
xx
X

dsi
dsi
p N
i
i
C
(dX.)] ( ~ ) + [ ~ a i - s i [dN.)]
1
dG
h
C
dµ1.
dµ1.
d0 C
X

Expression (10) has two terms, the first corresponding to the (com
pensated) own price or cost effect of the ith subsidy and the second
associated
corresponding to the/income effect on the wealthy household. The magnitudes
of these terms depend in turn on the magnitudes and. signs of the endowment effects on the health investments and fertility of the ith household.
These are given by
dXi
dµ

i

p Ni

= - hX i
X

(11)
dNi

--=

dµ1

PX

Ni

-hi
X

dXi
axi
[hi (dp ) C - - . ]
1
xx
dF
X
i
dNi
[hi (dN ) - - . ]
1
xx dp C
X
dF

where c denotes compensated effect.
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From expressions (10) and (11), sufficient (but not necessary)
conditions for larger family planning subsidies to be provided to low
endowment households (compensatory subsidization) are that (i) fertility
1
and health are gross substitutes (dx/dpc < 0, dN/dpx > O(so that dN /dµi > 0)
and (ii) dXi/dµi > O; i.e., more endowed households invest less in health.
In that case, the returns to further health investments will be smaller in high- t
in low-µ households and high-µ households will have at least.as many averted
births (at least as high family planning subsidy costs)' as low-µ households.
Thus, where fertility control subsi.dies but not heal th subsidies are prevalent, fertility and health investments will likely be gross substitutes
in

recipient households and such subsidies will be distributed dis-

proportionately to the lowest endowment households.
c.

Combining Health and Family Planning Subsidies

Having shown that family planning subsidies can effectively substitute
for health subsidies when there is (only) a health externality, under
certain conditions, we now consider whether a combination of health
and fertility control subsidies is redundant, that is, we consider whether
fertility control subsidies will be used in addition to health subsidies
in the presence of the health externality and in the absence of a popula
tion externality.
The budget constraint for the subsidy provider when both subsidies
can be used is:

(12)

G'

=

G

+

Ls
l.

i
X

and the equilibrium conditions for the two subsidy rates are:

12

s

(13)

i
C

pc

= - a

i
p NX £HH*
Hi - H*
i n~
X
i
+ EHN+
(
[EHX
~
H* )]
Ni
PX
£HX
T)Np

i

C

1
+ s Xi -xp
C

s

i
C

= O.

or pc

i
~p
i
(T)Xp

(14)

X

i
T)Np
X

-i-

nNp

Pc
PX

(Vi

XiNi

Ni)

X

i
~p

C

] iJJ -1

C

s

i
X

or - PX

= 0,

As before , the optim al subsid y levels depend on price
effect s.

in this case both

Howev er,

health and family planni ng subsid ies may be used

even if the objec tive functi ons for the low-in come househ olds
are strong ly
separa ble, no biolog ical relatio nship exists betwee n family
size and
child health ,and all low-in come househ olds invest equall y in
child health .
In that case, the equili brium condit ions are:
i
i
s
£HH*
X
£RX.
i
i.
NX
· i
-1
(15)
= [1 + Cl - • •
£
l)Xp
]
(n]P )
PX
N1X1
X
HX
x
i
s
X
or
= 0.
PX

J..)

s

(16)

i
C

pc
s

i xi

X

= s

Pc

-

( \l

i - Ni
i
i ) (nN
N

)-1

pc

i

or - C
pc

= 0

Expre ssion (15) indica tes that the health subsid y will be used
as
long as there is a health extern ality.

Expre ssion (16) indica tes that with

suffic iently high health -subsi dy expen diture s by the subsid izing
agent,
positi ve family planni ng subsid ies will also be optim al.

Moreo ver, family

planni ng and health subsid ies, where both are used, will be
positi vely
corre lated.

The compl ement arity betwee n the two subsid ies, despit e the

single health extern ality, arises from the intera ction betwee
n family
size and per-ch ild health expen diture s in the "gover nment al"
budge t
const raint (12)-- an increa se in the family planni .ng subsid y
to hbuseh old i ·
which lowers family size in i by one child saves the subsid izing
agent
i
i
the amou nts X; the cost of that increa se depend s positi vely
on the
X
numbe r of births averte d by the ith househ old and invers ely
on the magni tude
of its (own) fertil ity contro l elasti city.
When strict ly positi ve health and family planni ng subsid ies are
jointl y optim al, th~ma gnitud es of the subsid ies will also gener
ally
depend on the differ ing health endowments of the recipi ent househ
olds.
Moreo ver, the direct ion of the endow ment-s ubsidy assoc iation
is likely
to be identi cal for both the family planni ng and health subsid
y.
unlike in the single -subsi dy case, no

However,

simple suffic ient condi tion re

gardin g househ old demand relati onshi ps determ ines the sign of
the asso~ ia
tions betwee n the two subsid ies and the health endowments.

3.

Empirical Application:
a.

Laguna Province, the Philippines

The Data and the Distribution of Government Facilities

We have shown that the effects of government interventions on per~
child health within a family are incorrectly estimated if the distribu
tion of those interventions are influenced by the health predispositions
of households, associated with endowments or tastes, that are unobserved
by the researcher.

In order to correctly assess the impact of government

programs designed to influence health outcomes and to discover the govern
ment placement rules, it is thus necessary either to estimate or to
measure pre-program heterogeneity in health outcomes.

We will attempt to

obtain consistent estimates of both the health effects of governmental
family planning and health facilities and of facility pla~ement rules based
on longitudinal data describing the distribution of such public programs
and child health in 20 barrios (villages) in the lowland
areas of Laguna Province in the Philippines.

rice-producing

Information from surveys

of 240 randomly-selected households residing in these barrios on the age,
height and weight of every family member was collected in 1975 and 1979.
Information was also obtained in the 1979 survey round on the dates of
introduction of rural health clinics, family planning clinics, and pri
mary schools financed by the national government for each of the barrios.
The distribution of the public facilities across barrios is reported
in Table 1.

While all but two of the twenty barrios have a public primary

school, with such schools having been in existence for at least_fifteen
years prior to 1979 for each of the other eighteen barrios, health and
family planning facilities were more recently introduced and are less prevalent.

Table 1

Distri bution of Public Facil ities in Twenty Laguna Barrio s by
Number of Years Instit uted Prior to 1979

Years in Barrio

Family Planni ng
Clinic

Rural Health
Clinic

Primar y
School

0

8

7

2

0 - 4

4

3

0

5 - 9

5

0

0

10 - 14

2

4

15 - 19

0

2

4

+

1

4

14

20

20

20

20

Total

'-

0

J.)

Seven barrios had no public health clinic and eight barrios had no family
planning facility by 1979, with seven of the thirteen existing health
facilities and eleven of the twelve family planning facilities introduced
less than fifteen years prior to 1979.
The joint distribution of the family planning and health clinics
appears in conformity with the health externality model, as such facilities
appear to be placed in a complementary pattern--the Spearmen rank correla
tion of establishment dates for the family planning and health clinics
is .62.

Moreover, of the seven barrios that had no health clinic, five

also did not have a family planning clinic

and of the eight barrios without

a family planning clinic, five also did not have a health clinic.
barrios had neither facility as of 1979.

Five

The existence of two barrios withi

out a health clinic but with a family planning clinic suggests, as noted,
that if direct population externalities are ruled out, child health and
family size should appear to be gross substitutes among the Laguna
households.
b.

This is confirmed below.

Estimation Framework

To exploit the longitudinal data on health and the information on the
dates of program initiation, we modify the above framework to accommodate
the realities that governmemt programs are initiated at different times
and that observed child health in any period is a stock variable influenced
by resources allocated in the current and prior periods.

The impact of a

program on the current health status of a particular child will thus depend
upon the length of its previous exposure to the program.

We will exploit

the variability in program exposure across children to estimate the effects
afthe health and family planning programs and to estimate the barrio-specific
health endowments.

Variation in program exposure across children, however,
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occurs both because barrios differ in the timing of program introdu ction
and because childre n within the barrio differ in their dates of birth.
If child health investm ents differ system atically by the birthda te of
the
child due to health -relate d factors about which the researc her is unawar
e,
a spuriou s relatio nship between child health and program exposu re is
genera ted even if the timing of governm ent program s across barrio s is
unrelat ed to family or barrio endowm ents.
Let ts represe nt the year of the survey, tp the year the program
was institu ted, and tb the year of birth of a child.
been in effect t

- t

s

p

The program will have

years and for childre n born prior tot , i.e.,
p

tb < t , t
p

s

expose d.

Yet, a child born one year prior to the program will likely be more

- t

p

will be the number of years each such child will have been

strong ly impacte d by the program than a child b~rn five years prior
to the
· program .,

We thus adopt as a measur e of program exposu re the fractio n of a

child's lifetim e during which the child was exposed to the program .

Let

a

p i£ be the program exposu re
of child

i·

at the survey date, where a= ts - tb.

residin g in barrio £ who is of age a
Thus,

a

pi£= 0 if the program does not exist in the barrio as of the survey
date
t

- t

s
P 1·f t s > tp > tb in
. barrio
.
= --a-~

= 1 if t

s

> t

> t

b -

p

0

N

in barrio £.

Consid er the followi ng child health demand equatio n for a child i
aged a in barrio £ observe d at t :
s

17

where His an age-stan dardized measure of health, u. is a time-in variant,
1

child-sp ecific health endowme nt, theµ£ are location -specifi c health
factors and£ is a random error term.
when µ

1

Least squares estimati on of (17)

is unobserv ed leads to a biased estimate of

B,

the program exposure

effect, if t , the date the program was introduc ed, is related to the area's
p
endowme nts, as would be the case with non-rand om program placeme nt.
Within- family or barrio estimato rs of B, which purgr~ out, respecti vely, house
and location al charact eristics , are also biased, however , even if program
placeme nt is uncorre lated with child or family- specific endowme nts u if child
specific health endowme nts (within- family) or househo ld endowme nts (within
barrio)

influenc e the spacing of children .

In differen ced form, for a family witl

at least one child born prior to the program 's introdu ction, the within-f amily
1estimato r is:
t - t ) (t-b' - tb)
a'
a
p
c<
(18) Hj.Q,t
= (t s
H.l. R, t
+(u. - u.) + (£.
£it )
tb
,) (t s - t ) 113
l.
Jt s
J
s
s
s
b
s
where a'= ts - tb, > a.

introdu ction t

p

As can be seen, even if the dates of program

are indepen dent of the child-sp ecific error

u, if child j's

birth date tb, is related to his/her older sibling s' health status ui
the within-f amily
also biased.

estimate of the program exposure effect is

ln Rosenzw eig and Wolpin (1984) and Rosenzw eig (forthco ming)

it is shown that birth spacing and other child-sp ecific inputs are signific antly
correlat ed with prior sibling and family-s pecific endowme nts, leading to biased
estimate s
/of child-sp ecific resource allocati ons. Thus, as long as program placemen t
is not respons ive to purely random disturba nces (or perturb ations with
little persiste nce), only within-c hild estimato rs will yield consiste nt
estimate s of the effect of program exposure , given systema tic program place
ment and endowm ent-cond itioned birth spacing behavio r. 4 Longitu dinal informa tion
on child health outcome s

is required .
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c.

Program Assessment:

Comparisons of Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates

To estimate the effects of the facilities on child health, we selected a
sample of children (defined to be under eighteen as of 1979) for whom height
and weight information exists in both years of the Laguna survey, yielding
a working sample of 274 children in eighty-five households.

Table 2 provides

descriptive statistics for the. sample children at each of the two survey dates.
Height and weight are standardized by age and sex according to a national
schedule.

The average child in this sample in each of the two survey years

is somewhat over ninety percent as tall as the average Filipino child of
the same age and sex but only a little over eighty percent as heavy.

However,

the average child in the sample has evidently grown slightly in both dimen
sions relative to the standard between the two surveys.
i

Three separate specification~ were estimated corresponding to alternative assumptions about unobservables in the determination of height and
weight.

In the first two colunns of Table 3 ordinary least squares regres

sions are reported using the 1979 cross-section of 274 children.

The second

pair of columns repeats the cross-sectional regressions but adds barrio
dummy variables.

The third set of columns reports first-differenced re

gressions using the 1979 and 1975 (matched) samples.

The first column

of each set includes the child's exposure to primary schools in addition
to exposure to the health and family planning clinics.

In the upper half

of the table the dependent variable is the log of standardized height; in
the lower half the dependent variable is the log of standardized weight.
The differences in.·estimated program exposure effects across the
)

specifications are striking for either health measure.

In the height

regressions, both the cross-section and barrio fixed-effect health and

Table 2
Sample Statistic s

Variable
Natural logarithm of height normalize d by Philippin es age
standard, 1975
Natural logarithm of height normalize d by Philippin es age
standard, 1979
Natural logarithm of weight normalize d by Philippin es age
standard, 1975
Natural logarithm of weight normalize d by Philippin es age
stand.ard, 1979
Exposure to public health unit, fraction of years, 1975
Exposure to public health unit, fraction of years, 1979
Exposute to family planning clinic, fraction af years, 1975
Exposure to family planning clinic, .fraction of years, 1979
Exposure to public primary school, fraction of years, 1975
Exposure to public ~rimary school, fraction of years, 1979
Number of years rural health in barrio, 1979
Number of years family planning. clinic in barrio, 1979
Number of years public primary school in barrio, 1979
Number of barrios
Number of children

Mean

S.D.

4.525

.0715

4.543

.0566

4.377

.147

4.407
.456
.512
.162
.285
.871
.872
10.0
6.45
28.3

.147
.480
.451
.314
.333
.330
.336
10.3
13.67
16.6
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Table 3
Estimates of the Effects of Exposure to Governmental Programs
on the Standardized Height and Weight of Children

OLS
Cross-Section 8

Variable

Los
Rural Health Unit
Exposure
Family Planning
Exposure
Public Primary School
Exposure
R2

-.00976
(1.04)
-.00605
(0.49)
-.0193
(1. 75)

Fixed-Effect
Barrio

of Standardized Height
-.0205
(0.40)
-.00913
(0.27)

F

.0448
2.09

-.00473 .00950
(0.53)
(0.16)
-.0131 -.0135
(1.12)
(0.40)
-.172
(1.14)
.1738
.0339
1.88
2.09

d.f.

267

268

~

Rural Health Unit
Exposure
Family Planning
Exposure
Public Primary School
Exposure
R2
F

a

. -.0443
(1.82)
.0446
(1.40)
-.0503
(1.76)
.0447
2.08

248

1.69

.0511
(1.21)
.0710
(3.32)

.1695
2.12

.0507
(1.58)
.0709
(3.31)
(.0569
(0.10)
.074lb

.0660b

7.23

9.61

249

271

272

.0235
(1.59)
.0990
(1.99)
.240
(0.20)
.0514b

.0992
(1.52)
.121
(2. 76)

.0500b

4.89

7.16

Log of Standardized Weight
-.0313 -.0762 -.162
(1. 35)
(0.50)
(1.20)
.0263
.0677
.0803
(0.87)
(0.75)
(0. 90)
-.494
(1.24)
.1453
.1401
.0337
1.87

Fixed-Effect
Child

1.69

Equation also includes the age and educational attainment of each parent.
bFrom first-differenc ed equation.
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famil y plann ing clinic "effe cts" are gener ally negat ive
with stand ard error s
that are at least as large as the point estim ates. The
child fixed -effe ct
(long itudin al) estim ates, howev er, indic ate that expos
ure to healt h and
famil y plann ing clini cs incre ases heigh t, with the family
plann ing effec t
stati stica lly signi fican t at the usual confid ence level
s and the healt h
clini c effec t margi nally signi fican t.

The point estim ates indic ate that

the heigh t of a child for ,,hom no healt h clini c existe
d would be five per
cent below that for a child alway s expos ed to a clini c,
while expos ure to
a famil y plann ing clinic incre ases heigh t by seven perce
nt. The same patte rn
emerg es for publi c prima ry schoo ls,alt houg h in that case
the child fixed 
effec t point estim ate has a very large stand ard error
, due most likel y
to the small varia nce in expos ure assoc iated with the
longe vity of publi c

i

schoo ls displa yed in Table 1.
The weigh t regre ssion s tell a very simil ar story :

the cross -sect ion

and withi n-bar rio assoc iation s betwe en healt h clinic
expos ure and age
stand ardiz ed weigh t are negat ive, while the child fixed
effec t estim ates,
measu red relat ively preci sely, indic ate that expos ure
to eithe r the healt h
or famil y plann ing progra ms incre ases the weigh t-for- age
of child ren.

Here,

howev er, the _family plann ing effec t is somewhat more
robus t to speci ficati on,
althou gh the effec t of this progra m on child weigh t is
under estim ated by
more than 100 perce nt when only the cross -sect ional varia
tion in progra m
placem ent is utiliz ed. The point estim ates (last colum
n) indic ate that
unit incre ases in healt h and famil y plann ing clinic expos
ure incre ase age
stand ardiz ed child weigh t by nine and twelv e perce nt respe
ctive ly.
d.

Progr am Placem ent Rules

Wheth er child healt h statu s is measu red by age-s tanda
rdized heigh t or

LV

weight, the estimates of the child health effects of the family planning
program purged of contamination by the endogeneity of program placement
or birth-spacing in Table 3 indicate that child health and family size are
substitutes--subsidies to fertility control evidently augment resource
allocations to child health investment among Laguna households.

Thus, as

we have shown, family planning clinics may substitute for health clinics
in the presence of health externalities and/or may effectively complement
health clinics even in the absence of other externalities, due to the
interaction between family size and health investments in the "governmental"
budget constraint.
In this section we seek to discern whether the dates of introduction
of both the health and family planning clinics are systematically related
to tqe average child health endowment within a barrio, i.e., we estimate
the governmental program allocation rules.

The child-specific effects

that are estimated from (17) contain the elements ui, µ , a constant,
1
and

the effects of all time-invariant determinants of height and

weight, e.g., mother's schooling, but net out the effects of the programs.
However, since there are only two observations on each child, the estimated
fixed effect measures the true pre-program child effect with error.

Averaging

child-specific effects within each barrio thus yields a measure (gross of
time-invariant factors and random errors) of pre-program barrio level
health presumably observed by the government, though only indirectly by
us, and used by it to plan the timing of public program introduction.
We have two such measures, corresponding to height and to weight.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the impact of the average barrio-level
health endowment as measured by (the 1n of) child height on the length of

Table 4
Estima tes of the Effects of Barrio Child Health Condit ions
on the Placem ent of Governmental Programsa

Endowment Measure

(1)

tn Height , standar dized> -102
(0.92)
tn Height Effect

-

Predic ted tn Height Effect R2

Pub lie Program
Family
Plannin ~ Clinic

Rural
Health Unit

.0452

(2)

(3)

-

-

-145
(4.30)

-

-

-199
(4.34)

.507

.512

(1)

Primary
Public School
(1)
(2)

(2)

(3)

. 13.2
(0.09)

-

-

-81.9
(0.46)

-

..;129
(2.30)

-

-

-58.3

-

-

-151
(l.91)

-

-

-17.3
(0.16)

.0004

.228

.0114

.0316

.0015

a
bDependent variab le= years since program was initiat ed.
OLS coeffi cient.

.168

(3)

(O. 77)
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time in years that each of three programs--health clinics, family plan
ning clinics, primary schools-have been in existence in the barrio.
are thus twenty observations.

There

Parental education levels were intially in

cluded as discussed above, but were jointly insignificant at conventional
levels and so are excluded from the results actually presented.

The first

row uses actual mean height in the barrio and would only be correct if the
programs themselves had no impact on height.

The second row uses the

barrio-average fixed-effect computed from the child fixed-effect height
regression reported in column 6 of Table 3.

The third row uses the pre

dicted height fixed-effect obtained from a first stage regression in which
the (in) height fixed-effect is regressed on the (in) weight fixed-effect,
computed from the last column estimates of Table 3.

The purpose of this

latter procedure is to purge the estimate of the height fi~ed effect of
measurement error under the assumption that height and weight are both
measures of the same underlying health indicator.

5

While the timing of program initiation for all three programs appears
unrelated to average child height in the barrios (row one), when the
height effects of the three programs are removed, as in rows two and three,
the estimates indicate that the health and family planning clinics were
distributed systematically over time. and, as expected, were allocated in a
similar manner.

Moreover, the statistically significant, fixed effect

estimates imply a compensatory government allocation rule for
both of

the evidently complementary health programs.

Barrios with

lower pre-program health "endowments" evidently r.eceived both types of
health-augmenting programs earlier.

The timing of primary public school

placement is not significantly related to the health endowments, however,
a result consistent with our finding that such schools do not appear to
significantly affect child health.

I·I
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I

The point estimate s based on the predicte d height measure indicate
that where pre-prog ram standard ized height was one percent higher (about
one-fou rth of the standard deviatio n) the introdu ction of a health unit
was retarded by about two years.

The distribu tion of family planning

clinics was almost as respons ive to health endowment variatio n; their
introdu ction was delayed by about one and one-hal f years for every per
centage increase in standard ized height.

The compens atory program place

ment rule followed by the governm ental authori ties for the complem entary
health and family planning program s thus appears to have been respons ible
for the signific ant negative biases observed in the cross-se ctional
estimate s of the effects of the two program s in -T,able 3.
3.

Conclus ion
In this paper we have specifie d and tested a model of the distri

bution by a central authori ty of family planning and child health investme nt
subsidie s across heteroge nous localiti es and assessed the

bias in the

evaluati ons of such program s based on cross-se ctional data implied by
non-rand om program distribu tion.

A basic feature of the model is the

presence of a health externa lity, which is shown to be sufficie nt along
with plausib le features of househo ld behavio r to make selectiv e subsi
dization of fertilit y control either alone or in combina tion with health
investm ent subsidie s Pareto- efficien t.

Thus the issue of whether or

not populat ion growth per~ impedes economic developm ent, whether there
are direct populat ion externa lities,m ay be irreleva nt to the issue of whether
family planning program s are desirab le intrume nts for promotin g economic
growth.
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The model suggests that subsidizati on of fertility control is likely
to be Pareto efficient in the presence of health or human capital exter
nalities when a) human capital and family size are gross substitutes
and/orb) any per-child human capital subsidies are provided to recipient
households.

In the first case, fertility control subsidies may substitute

for direct subsidies to health investment and an equalizing distributio n
of the subsidies, the highest family planning subsidies to the lowest
health recipient households, is efficient-W hen both family planning and
and health subsidies are used, fertility control subsidies serve to
minimize the subsidy burden for donors and will be highest where total
subsidy expenditure s per child are greatest, but in general the ordering
of the distributio n of the joint subsidies by the inherent healthiness
of recipients cannot be predicted.
Longitudina l data describing the timing of program implementat ion
in twenty randomly-sa mpled barrios .in the Laguna Province in the Philippines
revealed a systematic pattern of health and family planning program
placement in accord with the model:

·each program was initiated earliest

in the low-health barrios, most of the barrios that had any program had
both programs by the date of the last survey round, and when endogenous
program placement was taken into account, exposure to either program ap
... _,peared

t,o significant ly improve children's health status.

Family size

and child health thus appeared to be gross substitutes in the Laguna
. ~~~.:::.:·:.:~~.< .£.~. -·i·~.; f:~~~
,.7'::·-~··~!f'!it':':,,"/-.,__' ·.
. .. ,_.,,,:c
iy .pousehoids ,

i.. . . .

',:":.. .

a- sufficient condition for the presence of some barrios

with a family planning,bu t not a health, clinic.
The compensator y pattern of program placement, when not taken into
account, yielded estimates of the effects of the two programs on child
health that would have led to false rejection of the hypothesis that

I

I

I
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either or both improved child health.

Those results thus imply that

conclusions drawn from studies exploiting the cross-sectional variation
in program intensities to evaluate programs and/or to identify structural
relationships characterizing household behavior should be interpreted
with care.

Additional empirical and theoretical work integrating cen-

tral and local program determination with household optimization would appear
warranted.
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Footnotes
1.

Given technological advances in contraceptive technology, a rationale for the

public dissemination of general contraceptive information may be warranted.
However, this does not necessarily justify subsidization of contraceptive
devices or of person-specific contraceptive services.

Moreover, as low

fertility households gain most from the acquisition of contraceptive
information, disproportionate information provision to such households
would appear to be implied by interest group theory.
2.

We assume that households do not move across localities.

The conse-

quences of the selective migration of agents in response to changes in
local programs are considered in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1984b).
3.

The evidence on the biological effect of family size or birth order
i

on child health suggests that such a iinkage provides little justifi
cation for subsidization of fertility

control on health grounds.

In

Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), birthweight is found to significantly
increase with increasing birth order; in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1984a),
little or not relationship is found between birth order and birthweight,
although longer (prior) birth intervals increase birthweight.

Both of

these studies take into account in estimation the existence of heterogeneity in health endowments.
4.

Indeed, it is not necessarily true that the within-barrio regression

performs better than the cross-section regression if the within-child
regression is taken to be the correctly specified model.
5.

The results reported in Table 4 are qualitatively identical when the

standardized weight effect is used to measure the connnunity-level health
endowment.

